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The Trent Affair: Avoiding a Possible Crisis during the Civil War 
 In November 1861, Union Naval Captain Charles Wilkes seized the Trent, a British 
mailing ship, because it was transporting two Confederate diplomats, John Slidell and James 
Mason. Wilkes captured the two Confederate representatives due to what he considered were 
treasonous actions against the Union, but he did so without any orders from the Union 
government.1 Under a proclamation issued by the Queen of Britain at the start of the Civil War, 
Britain recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent and was not supposed to transport the 
dispatches of Slidell and Mason because international law considered them contraband.2 Yet, by 
acknowledging the Confederacy as belligerent, Britain stated that the Union and the Confederacy 
would be given equal treatment in British ports. Confederate ships could obtain necessary 
supplies from British ports to aid them in fighting Union ships. Northerners expected British 
support and were dismayed by the British acknowledgement of the Confederacy. The Trent 
Affair escalated the already unpopular opinion towards Britain held by the Union public due to 
the Queen’s Proclamation. The Union publically celebrated the actions of Wilkes as the first 
naval success against the Confederacy. Newspapers depicted the British as trying to take away 
 
1 Thomas Ewing to Abraham Lincoln, November 18, 1861, transcribed and annotated by 
the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln 
Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory 
Project, [2000-02]), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1303500)), accessed October 11, 2016. 
2 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American 
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 48. 
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the victory and, as a result, helping facilitate negotiations with the Confederates. Union citizens 
did not want to concede to British demands to give up the rebels. Northerners felt that if Britain 
wanted to go to war over the Trent Affair, then they would mobilize for such a conflict. The 
Lincoln administration did not want to give any indication to the Confederacy that the British 
could have their way with the Union, for that would just inspire the Confederacy to strive for 
British support. President Lincoln dealt with the public pressure, while also receiving 
correspondence from government officials. However, the advice Lincoln received urged him to 
concede to Britain’s demands, which went against the public’s wish to fight Britain. By adhering 
to British demands concerning the Trent Affair, Lincoln sacrificed public opinion for his 
decision to maintain peaceful relations with Britain. Lincoln had the greater goal of reunifying 
the United States and he did not want to hinder reunification by expanding the war 
internationally.  
 To understand the heated public opinion over the Trent Affair, President Lincoln 
considered the previous relationship between Britain and the United States. British aristocrats 
identified with southern Americans in that their political leadership was similar. Historian Dean 
B. Mahin explains, “Southern leadership was drawn from a plantation aristocracy with many 
similarities to the agrarian aristocracy that still dominated British politics and British 
governments.”3 The ruling class in Britain was worried that if the popular democracy of the 
North prevailed, there would be increased pressure in Britain to open representation to lower 
class workers and women. The British also kept their economic interest in mind when it came to 
supporting the North or the South. The South exported cotton to Britain and were consumers of 
 
3 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American 
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 26. 
 Patterson 3 
British industry, while the North was a competitor to Britain because of its own industrial 
developments. Britain and the South were both against the protective tariff placed on northern 
goods to protect from British competition. Southerners argued that the protective tariff was only 
in place to benefit the North as it fell disproportionally on the South. Therefore, Britons had 
political and economic reasons for feeling more sympathetic to the Confederate cause.  
The Union came face to face with British support for the Confederacy when Queen 
Victoria issued Britain’s proclamation of neutrality. The Queen’s proclamation proved to support 
both the Union and the Confederacy, which was not anticipated by the Lincoln administration.4 
The proclamation profited the Union because Britain offered its acceptance of the blockade 
instituted by Lincoln to cut off southern ports. Yet, the proclamation also benefitted the 
Confederacy because it acknowledged it as a belligerent, therefore, making the Union and 
Confederacy equal in terms of rights for belligerent nations. Under the proclamation, the Union 
and the Confederacy both had the ability to acquire fuel, supplies, and repairs in British ports.5 
Union public opinion responded with condemnation of British support of the Confederacy, “The 
latter aspect of the proclamation precipitated a roar of disapproval from Northerners, who had no 
patience for the intricate arguments of international law that justified the British action.”6 
Northerners expected British support due to the fact that this was a civil war caused by slavery 
and Britain was leading international abolition efforts by banning slavery in its colonies and 
stopping the slave trade anywhere it could. To respond to the proclamation of neutrality and the 
 
4 Gordon H. Warren, Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981) 72. 
5 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American 
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 48. 
6 Gordon H. Warren, Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981) 71. 
 Patterson 4 
outraged Americans, Lincoln’s administration initially took the position that if Britain were to 
have relations with the Confederates then the Union would cease to continue relations with 
Britain.7 
The Trent Affair occurred in the midst of these previously established tensions between 
the Union and Great Britain and the public within the Union was quick to analyze who should 
bear the blame. The Lowell Daily Citizen and News took the position that Britain was violating 
its proclamation of neutrality by letting Confederate diplomats James Mason and John Slidell 
aboard the British mailing ship the Trent. The article stated that the captain of the Trent should 
have been aware of his nation’s law of neutrality and he also should have been aware that Mason 
and Slidell were working in aggression against the Union. The article concluded, “It would be 
hard practice to condemn the conduct of Wilkes on the ground of another party’s ignorance of 
law, or what may be regarded as having all the force of law. We suppose the presumption of law 
is that every subject has knowledge of its requirements.”8 The Union public felt all the blame 
should be put on the captain of the Trent, due to his allowance of Mason and Slidell on board. 
However, not every citizen knew what was considered legal under the proclamation of neutrality 
and international naval law, which ironically, Union newspapers were criticizing the captain of 
the Trent for. International law required Wilkes to find Confederate dispatches aboard the Trent 
and bring the ship to a prize court in Union territory. However, Wilkes did not find any 
dispatches and took it upon himself to arrest the rebels without a decision from a prize court. The 
public did not entertain the possibility that Wilkes’ victory was illegal under international law or 
consider the implications of war with Britain. Yet, despite public elation for his efforts, Wilkes 
 
7 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American 
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 30 and 49. 
8 “War Intelligence,” Lowell Daily Citizen and News, November 30, 1861: 2. 
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had disrespected the British flag and the Lincoln administration had to consider seriously the 
possibility of an international conflict. 
On November 18, 1861, President Lincoln received a letter from Thomas Ewing, a 
senator in Ohio and supporter of the Union.9 Ewing explicitly expressed his concern about the 
Trent incident based on how various newspapers responded to the event. Ewing’s worry was that 
Britain would see the arrest of Mason and Slidell as an infringement on the rights of the British 
to carry two Confederate representatives without dispatches. Even though Ewing knew Lincoln 
did not order Captain Wilkes to arrest them, he stated, “It is not yet in fact the wrong of the U.S., 
but of the commanding officer, for the boarding and arrest under the British flag was not ordered 
by you—and now the Law of Nations requires that you disavow the act.” Ewing advised Lincoln 
to withhold support of Captain Wilkes’ actions and to correct this violation of law by allowing 
Mason and Slidell to board a British ship and proceed to their destination without interruption.10 
Ewing seemed to have faith in Britain’s proclamation of neutrality because he was not worried 
about the two diplomats reaching Britain, he was more worried about the British using the Trent 
Affair as an excuse to weaken the Union through war. The British despised the economic 
competition that the North created and a war would be the opportunity the British needed to 
remove their rivals.   
 
9 R. Owen Williams, “Ewing, Thomas,” American National Biography Online, accessed 
October 11, 2016, http://www.anb.org.providence.idm.oclc.org/articles/07/07-
00805.html?from=../04/04-00355.html&from_nm=Ewing%2C%20Thomas%2C%20Jr.  
10 Thomas Ewing to Abraham Lincoln, November 18, 1861, transcribed and annotated by 
the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln 
Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory 
Project, [2000-02]), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1303500)), accessed October 11, 2016. 
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Ewing’s opinion was unlike the popular opinion of the public in the North, as northerners 
saw the capture of Mason and Slidell as a triumph over Confederate forces.  While it appeared 
that Ewing expressed support of the Southern position by allowing the representatives to reach 
Britain, his intent was not to further the Confederacy’s objective to gain support from abroad. He 
believed that the acceptance of Britain’s demands was the only way to prevent a conflict with the 
British. Ewing stated, “—and in order to repair this wrong and cause that immunity to have been, 
and still to be absolute, England may rightfully demand that the prisoners be placed as nearly as 
possible in status quo—That is to say—that they be placed on board a British ship and suffered 
to pursue their journey without interruption—.”11 While not in support of the southern position, 
Ewing advised Lincoln to enable the southern diplomats in reaching Britain. Public opinion in 
the Union was against Ewing’s position, for they felt that Mason and Slidell were acting as 
traitors and should not be allowed to carry out their mission. Also, the public was not concerned 
with provoking an international war by keeping the diplomats in custody in Union territory. The 
public felt that if Britain truly wanted a war, the Lincoln administration would mobilize for one. 
However, President Lincoln agreed with Ewing in that he did not want Britain to use the Trent 
Affair as justification for war, but he also had to combat his own concerns of disagreeing with 
the public by releasing the envoys. 
By December 16, 1861, President Lincoln also received correspondence from former 
president Millard Fillmore. Fillmore was in support of Lincoln’s stand against the Confederacy 
and did not want to lose hope in the unification of the United States by risking a larger war with 
 
11Thomas Ewing to Abraham Lincoln, November 18, 1861, transcribed and annotated by 
the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln 
Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory 
Project, [2000-02]), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1303500)), accessed October 11, 2016. 
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Britain. Possible consequences of war with Britain were the acknowledgement of the 
Confederacy as independent, a break in Lincoln’s blockade proclamation, and the opening of 
free trade to British producers. Therefore, both the Union and Confederacy would be dependent 
on British manufacturing.12 These were the fears that Fillmore and other Union government 
officials were concerned about. However, unlike Ewing, Fillmore did not want to adhere to the 
demands of Britain, for he felt it was an issue worthy of arbitration by a neutral nation’s crowned 
head. Fillmore claimed that, “by urging in a firm but conciliatory argument in reply to the 
demand of Great Britain, our views of the Belligerent right to arrest these men, but conclude by 
saying that although we feel assured that we are right, …no insult was intended to the flag of 
Great Britain.” With this suggestion, Fillmore wanted to make the Trent issue into an effort to 
settle international naval law for future conflicts between any and all nations. Fillmore’s ideas 
are ideal to handling the situation, while also appeasing the public. If a neutral arbitrator, 
specifically a crowned head from Europe, assessed the Trent Affair, then Lincoln would not have 
to give in to the demands of Britain unless it was the verdict of the arbitration.13 Lincoln would 
not be subject to public dissent, for a legal decision would be responsible for the Union abiding 
by Britain’s demands. 
On December 26, 1861, the New York Times reported that Britain’s demands included 
“an apology, and the restitution of Mason and Slidell to British custody.”14 President Lincoln 
 
12 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American 
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 77.  
13 Millard Fillmore to Abraham Lincoln, December 16, 1861, transcribed and annotated 
by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln 
Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory 
Project, [2000-02]), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1344100)), accessed October 11, 2016. 
14 “Important from Washington: Our Special Washington Dispatches,” New York Times, 
December 26, 1861: 1. 
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took Ewing’s and Fillmore’s counsel into account when deciding how to answer the demands of 
Britain in his December 1861 “Memorandum on the Trent Affair.” Lincoln explained his 
position on the issue. For example, he stated that Wilkes did not have orders from the Union for 
the arrest and there was no intention to insult the British flag.15 President Lincoln was under 
extreme pressure from Britain to conform to their demands, for the British ambassador to the 
Union, Lord Lyons, gave a seven-day deadline for a response. If this deadline was not met, Lord 
Lyons was instructed by official dispatches to depart for London with his staff so Britain could 
prepare for war.16 Yet, Lincoln also did not want to risk hurting the public morale that Wilkes’ 
actions inspired within the Union. Succumbing to British demands meant disregarding the 
public’s desire to give credence to Wilkes’ actions and promote them as a victory for the Union. 
Lincoln’s memorandum, which was never sent, exemplified his initial position to deny full 
responsibility for the issue and he urged Britain to consider her role in the affair. “The President 
desires, among other things, to bring into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the 
United States—the position Great Britain has assumed, including Her Majesty’s proclamation, in 
relation thereto—the relation the persons, whose seizure is the subject of complaint.” With these 
initial efforts, Lincoln sought to appeal to the public’s opinion by not giving in to Britain. He 
insisted that Britain understand the state of rebellion the United States was in and consider the 
position Britain assumed under the Queen’s Proclamation. 
 
15 Abraham Lincoln, December 1861, transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies 
Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000-02]), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1362300)), accessed 
October 11, 2016. 
16 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American 
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 75. 
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In his memorandum, Lincoln asked for friendly arbitration instead of openly releasing 
Mason and Slidell.17 However, Lincoln’s memorandum was never sent, as he explained, “I found 
I could not make an argument that would satisfy my own mind.” The memorandum was purely a 
tool for Lincoln to experiment with his position on the issue. Lincoln’s argument in the 
memorandum was based on the process of arbitration, as Fillmore had advised. Typically, 
arbitration was used for boundary disputes and financial claims, in which case a crowned head 
working as a neutral arbitrator would settle. Yet, “the arbitration process was ill suited for the 
resolution of conflicts in which either side thought its national honor was threatened.”18 National 
honor proved to be too subjective of a concept to be determined by arbitration, as it was not as 
concrete as a boundary dispute. Lincoln turned to Secretary of State William Seward, who 
constructed a response that delivered Mason and Slidell to British forces, but also argued in 
defense of Wilkes. As a result, Lincoln’s administration provided a response to the Trent Affair 
that satisfied British demands.  
Union public opinion responded to the concessions made by the Lincoln administration 
with disappointment. Attorney General Edward Bates wrote of the, “great reluctance on the part 
of some of the members of the cabinet—and even the President himself” due to the worry of “the 
displeasure of our own people—lest they should accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of 
England.” President Lincoln understood the necessity of having a united Union citizenry and he 
was worried that by succumbing to British demands, he would create a divide between the public 
 
17 Abraham Lincoln, December 1861, transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies 
Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of  
Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000-02]), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1362300)), accessed 
October 11, 2016. 
18 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American 
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 76-77.  
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and the Union government.19 The Daily Evening Traveler published an article stating the 
discontent felt by the public, “It is not too much to say that the announcement of the decision of 
the government in regard to the Trent affair, has been received by the public with profound and 
unprecedented regret, mingled not only with indignation, but with extreme bitterness toward 
England.”20 This article provided an answer to Lincoln’s worries, for the public response 
remained anti-British instead of against the Lincoln administration. Public sentiment was for 
addressing Britain diplomatically, but Lincoln understood that the consequences of standing up 
to Britain diplomatically would have led to war. Avoiding conflict with Britain outweighed the 
advantage of appealing to public opinion. The response to Lincoln’s decision in Union 
newspapers helped turn public opinion to accept the results of the affair. The New York Herald 
stated, “In adopting this alternative of submission to these peremptory demands, the 
administration runs the hazard of disappointing the popular sentiment of our loyal States. But a 
little reflection will satisfy every intelligent mind of the wisdom of deferring a final settlement 
with England until we shall have made and end of this Southern rebellion.”21 Citizens remained 
united in the idea that the British were taking advantage of the Union in its weakened state and 
they could not blame Lincoln for giving in to British demands. 22 Lincoln’s actions were 
successful in evading war with Britain and his next task involved dispelling the public’s anger 
against Britain by directing their focus toward the reunification of the United States.  
 
19 Norman B. Ferris, The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis (Knoxville: The University of 
Tennessee Press, 1977) 185.  
20 “The Trent Case,” Daily Evening Traveller, December 31, 1861: 1.  
21 “Important from Washington: Mason and Slidell to be Delivered up If Demanded,” 
The New York Herald, December 21, 1861: 4. 
22 Gordon H. Warren, Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981) 208. 
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As a result of the Trent Affair, Lincoln was able to avoid a war with Britain, but was left 
to quell the anti-British public opinion that spread throughout the Union. Northerners expected 
the support of Britain in the beginning of the Civil War and the Queen’s Proclamation of 
neutrality came as an angry shock to the public. After the Trent Affair transpired, the Union 
citizenry and press responded with immense approval of Captain Wilkes’ actions. Union 
newspapers reported that Wilkes captured the first naval victory for the Union. Adhering to 
British demands was to throw away the triumph of Wilkes and Lincoln did not want to 
disappoint the public. Thomas Ewing warned Lincoln that he should not allow the British to use 
the Trent Affair as an excuse to attack the already weakened Union. Millard Fillmore agreed 
with Ewing, but wanted to solve the issue through arbitration. Lincoln adopted both Ewing’s and 
Fillmore’s considerations and developed a memorandum in response to the crisis. Even though 
Lincoln never sent his memorandum, it was an example of his efforts to understand the Trent 
Affair personally.23 He was much more focused on the reunification of the United States and he 
did not want the Trent Affair to be the crisis that ruined his goal. Therefore, Lincoln had to 
sacrifice public dissent for the greater cause of the Union, that being fighting the Civil War. The 
Trent Affair resulted in an anti-British citizenry, but it set the precedent for future peaceful 
Anglo-American relations. 
 
 
 
 
23 Abraham Lincoln, December 1861, transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies 
Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000-02]), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1362300)), accessed 
October 11, 2016. 
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